IN FEBRUARY, China voted in favour of UN Resolution 1970 authorising sanctions against the Libyan government. The following month, China chose not to veto UN Resolution 1973 imposing a no-fly zone in Libya, the freezing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi's assets and the referral of Col Gaddafi to the International Criminal Court.

These gestures going against China's usual stance of non-interference have been widely perceived as a positive reaction to calls for China to become a responsible stakeholder of the world.

But is China really irresponsible in the first place?

As of December last year, China has dispatched 17,390 military personnel to 19 UN peacekeeping missions. Currently, China has more peacekeeping troops at the UN than any of the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. Last year, China started deploying naval frigates to patrol the Gulf of Aden, and while their primary mission is to escort Chinese merchant vessels, they are available to protect other ships upon request.

Since 1999, China has not taken loans from the International Development Association (IDA) of the World Bank, and in 2007, China went from being a receiver of aid to becoming a contributor to the IDA. The World Food Programme made its last donation to China in 2005, after rendering assistance for 25 years.

At the UN High Level Plenary Meeting on the Millennium Development Goals on Sept 23 last year, Premier Wen Jiabao pledged to increase foreign assistance. He shared China's plans to build 200 schools for the developing nations, send 3,000 medical experts, train 5,000 medical staff, and offer medical equipment and medicine for 100 hospitals. China will also donate US$14 million (S$17 million) to the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria in the next three years. The Chinese government, by the end of 2009, has exempted 25.6 billion yuan (S$4.8 billion) of debt for heavily indebted poor countries and the least developed ones.

Since July last year, China has given

zero-tariff treatment to the exports from 33 less developed countries for more than 4,700 tariff items, covering the vast majority of the products from these countries. Africa received the largest amount of aid, followed by Latin America and lastly South-east Asia. While the aid to Africa and South-east Asia focused on infrastructure and public works projects, the aid for Latin America was concentrated on natural resources development. It should be noted that this development aid clearly benefits the Chinese economy through repayment in kind (in the form of natural resources) and the awarding of contracts to Chinese companies.

Based on the latest statistics, China is the third largest contributor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) at 4.01 per cent, after the United States (17.75 per cent) and Japan (6.58 per cent). China was among the first countries to agree to buy the first bonds issued by the IMF for approximately US$50 billion. While there was general expectation that China would sell some of its foreign-exchange reserves to buy the IMF bonds in order to reduce its exposure to the US dollar, China abided by the IMF practice where member states make most of their contributions in local currencies.

China has often been accused of manipulating its currency, despite the fact that after the currency peg ended in 2005, the yuan rose 21 per cent in the following three years, and the appreciation was subsequently halted for two years to help Chinese exporters during the global financial crisis. In the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, China also chose not to depreciate the yuan, partly in order not to enjoy an unfair advantage over its South-east Asian neighbours, but also because having a stable currency was a requisite to join the World Trade Organisation.

Heavy criticism has been levelled at China's relationship with rogue states. Its relations with countries such as Iran are clearly tactical and the result of having to carve out political and economic space in regions not dominated by the US. Analysts estimate that by 2020, nearly 65 per cent of the oil consumed in China will have to be imported. According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, China will be dependent on the Middle East for 70 per cent of its oil needs by 2015. Iran is perhaps China's most stable strategic option, in view of the pro-US alignment of all the other Gulf oil states.

Since the inception of the UN Security Council, China has exercised its veto only six times, compared to the US, Britain and France which have exercised their vetoes 82 times, 32 times and 18 times respectively. China has not vetoed any action against Iran, North Korea, Sudan, while the US has blocked more than 30 UN resolutions against Israel. The case of Libya has shown that it is possible for China to move from a blanket 'non-interference' policy, to one based on a case-by- case consideration. This is a positive development in Chinese foreign policy that should be encouraged. Despite its strong stance on its policy, China generally avoids being isolated on major global issues. Working to ensure the other main parties are in agreement on key decisions is instrumental in bringing China on board.

China is currently straddling two identities - it is a developing country by many measures and yet, due to the size of its gross domestic product and phenomenal rate of economic growth, it plays in the league of developed countries. It is still wounded by history, and has politically manipulated that history to emphasise its role as a victim. At the same time, it has demonstrated its confidence to use its new-found clout and power. The world is at once confronted by a China that is outwardly assertive, confident and powerful, and a country inwardly-focused on internal problems it considers must be prioritised above anything else.

China is at a critical juncture now where it is coming to terms with external expectations of its global role, and to what extent it should conform to global norms or recalibrate them. The significant efforts made by China in recent decades should not be overlooked. Labelling China irresponsible is unlikely to achieve the desired effect.

The writer, a Singaporean, is an Associate Fellow at Chatham House, London, and a PhD candidate at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan University, Shanghai.

Source - The Straits Times (http://www.straitstimes.com/Review/Others/STIStory_677317.html)